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Abstract 
This paper argues (against Fred Feldman) that happiness and pleasure are distinct states of 
mind because they stand in a distinct logical relation to belief. Roughly, being happy about a 
state of affairs s implies that one believes that s satisfies the description ‘s’ and that it is in 
some way good whereas taking pleasure in s does not. Feldman’s analysis of happiness in 
terms of attitudinal pleasure overlooks this distinction.  
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1. Introduction 
The English language distinguishes two mental states under the headings ‘happiness’ and 
‘pleasure’. Counterparts, if not exact synonyms, can be found in many other languages.1 
Happiness is usually thought of as a deep and enduring emotion, such as might accompany 
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 Counterparts to ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ include, in German, ‘Glück’ and ‘Vergnügen’, in French, ‘bonheur’ 
and ‘plaisir’, in Russian, ‘cчастье’ (schastye) and ‘yдовольствие’ (udovolstviye), and in Chinese, 幸福 (xingfu) 
and 快樂 (kuaile). These terms are not exact synonyms. The English word ‘happy’ tends to be used more freely 
than its cognates in other languages, many of which contain residues of an older, eudaimonistic understanding 
of happiness.  Still, the paired terms mark out the same general distinction. See Wierzbicka [2004]. 
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falling in love or the completion of an important piece of work. Pleasure, by contrast, is often 
fleeting and sensual. The experiences of sex and eating are standard examples. 
Despite this widely recognised and entrenched distinction, some philosophers argue that there 
is no fundamental difference between happiness and pleasure, that happiness can indeed be 
defined in terms of pleasure. According to Fred Feldman [2010: 137], ‘to be happy at a time 
is to have a net positive balance of intrinsic occurrent attitudinal pleasure over intrinsic 
occurrent attitudinal displeasure at that time. More simply, to be happy is at a moment to be 
taking more pleasure than displeasure in things at that moment.’ Feldman makes it clear that 
he intends this as a real definition of the ordinary meaning of ‘happy’. ‘When it [the word 
“happy”] is used seriously as part of a description of someone’s mental state, it seems to me 
that it is generally used in such a way that its meaning would be made somewhat more 
precise and articulate but not seriously distorted if it were replaced by “takes more attitudinal 
pleasure than displeasure in things” [ibid.: 135].’  
Let us call Feldman’s thesis ‘hedonism about happiness’. The central thesis of what follows 
is that hedonism about happiness is false. Happiness is categorially distinct from pleasure, 
because it stands in a distinct relation to belief. Feldman’s definition of happiness in terms of 
pleasure is made plausible only by a subtle equivocation on the meaning of ‘pleasure’, to be 
explored further at the end of this essay. 
2. Preliminary clarifications 
Before moving on to the main discussion, a couple of clarifications are necessary. First, I am 
concerned with the concepts of happiness and pleasure as they are understood by competent 
speakers of modern English. I am not concerned with the older meaning of ‘happiness’, still 
current among translators of ancient philosophy, as eudaimonia or wellbeing. I take 
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happiness, like pleasure, to be a state of mind – something that cannot by definition be 
affected by events taking place after one’s death or without one’s knowledge. Feldman also 
understands himself to be concerned with the ordinary modern meaning of ‘happiness’, and I 
assume with the ordinary modern meaning of ‘pleasure’ too, though he is less explicit on this 
latter point. 
Secondly, I treat both pleasure and happiness as primarily attitudinal states, that is, as states 
directed towards an object, whether a thing, event or state of affairs. This is controversial, in 
both cases, and requires some words of justification. 
Philosophers debate whether what makes an experience pleasant is the presence of a distinct 
sensation of pleasure or simply the fact that we take pleasure in it. The first is the sensational, 
the second the attitudinal view of pleasure. (A parallel debate takes place about pain.) 
Attitudinal theories of pleasure vary according to their characterisation of the attitude in 
question. Candidates include enjoying, apprehending as desirable, desiring to continue, and 
being pleased about.
2
 Among these, the most plausible is enjoying, since it implies least in 
the way of judgements and motives. If you take pleasure in a melody, you must at least be 
enjoying it, though you needn’t apprehend it as desirable, desire it to continue, or be pleased 
about it. I return to the issue in due course. 
Both sensational and attitudinal views of pleasure face problems. The sensational view 
confronts the objection that pleasures form an open-ended and heterogeneous set, with no 
obvious common quality. What could unite the experiences of eating pickled walnuts, 
listening to Peking opera and perusing economic statistics other than the fact that some 
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 ‘Apprehending as desirable’ comes from Sidgwick [1874: 127]. ‘Desiring to continue’ comes from Brandt 
[1979: 38]. ‘Being pleased about comes from Feldman [2010: 109]. 
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human beings take pleasure in them? On the other side, the attitudinal view faces the problem 
that some sensations seem to be simply pleasant, whether or not we take pleasure in them. A 
dedicated monk might find the touch of a woman’s hand pleasant though he does not take any 
pleasure in it. Similarly, pains can be enjoyed without thereby ceasing to be pains.  
L. W. Sumner [1996: 81-112] has suggested a sensible compromise. Pleasure, he argues, can 
refer either to a specific bodily sensation, typically associated with sex, warm baths and the 
like, or to a general attitude of taking pleasure in or enjoying. (Likewise, pain can refer either 
to a specific bodily sensation or to a general attitude of finding disagreeable or ‘disenjoying’.) 
There is no necessary connection between these two types of pleasure: sensory pleasures are 
typically and unsurprisingly enjoyed, but they can always be disenjoyed, as the example of 
the monk shows. Any plausible version of hedonism about happiness is clearly going to focus 
on attitudinal, not sensory pleasure, since happiness rests on many things besides physical 
sensations and it is unclear how a sensation of pleasure that is not enjoyed could contribute to 
happiness. Feldman himself [2010: 109-10], while admitting the existence of purely sensory 
pleasures, couches his definition of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure alone. It is 
accordingly on attitudinal pleasure that I shall focus.  
Happiness too is primarily attitudinal. Generally speaking, people are not just happy; they are 
happy about … or happy that .... This is not to say that happiness is a purely intellectual state, 
without accompanying bodily feelings. Like any emotion, happiness is both attitudinal and 
felt in the body. Understanding how it can be both these things at once is a vexed problem in 
philosophical psychology, but not one that need concern us here.
3
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 For a subtle attempt to do justice both the intentionality and the felt quality of emotions, see Goldie [2000]. 
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This attitudinal understanding of happiness confronts three apparent counter-examples. Jane 
might be happy without being happy about anything because she is a) in a happy mood, b) a 
happy person, or c) a baby or an animal. Let me deal with these in turn. 
Happiness as mood. Moods, in contradistinction to emotions, are sometimes said to lack 
objects. This would spell trouble for an attitudinal analysis of happiness, since there are 
clearly such things as happy moods. But is it true?  
Peter Goldie [2000] has convincingly argued that moods are distinguished from emotions not 
by lack of object-directedness but by lack of specificity. As he puts it, ‘a mood involves 
feeling towards an object just as much as does an emotion, although ... what the feeling is 
directed towards will be less specific in the case of a mood [ibid.: 143].’ This must be right. 
When I’m in a happy mood I’m not happy about anything in particular but disposed to be 
happy about many things or about things in general.
4
 I warm to the dull old gentleman on the 
bus; I forgive the insult I received this morning; I may even, if I’m metaphysically inclined, 
start looking on the world as intrinsically just and beautiful. ‘The world of the happy is quite 
another than that of the unhappy’ wrote Wittgenstein in the Tractatus [1922: 88]. 
The existence of happy moods poses no threat, then, to the claim that happiness is attitudinal. 
We can simply treat happy moods as modifications, of varying degrees of generality, of 
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 Matthew Rattcliffe [2008: 41] has argued, drawing on Heidegger, that some moods (‘existential feelings’ as 
he calls them) are not experiences of ‘entities in general’ but rather ‘ways of finding ourselves in the world, 
existential backgrounds that shape all our experience’.  I don’t want to come to a view on this intriguing 
suggestion here. All I shall say is that if happiness does take such an ‘existential’ form, this is even less readily 
assimilable to pleasure than the more usual objectual forms, and so does not pose a problem for my general 
argument.  
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happiness about particular objects. This is (roughly) how Feldman himself [2010: 137-43] 
deals with the phenomenon of happy and unhappy moods.   
All-in-all happiness. People are often said to be simply happy, without further qualification. 
‘How’s Jane these days?’ ‘She’s very happy.’ Such ‘all-in-all’ happiness looks, on the face of 
it, non-attitudinal. But it is not really. If Jane is not happy about anything and has no tendency 
to be in a happy mood, it makes no sense to call her happy. All-in-all happiness is logically 
tied to happiness about specific things or things in general, which is not necessarily to say 
that it can be derived from this latter by means of some algorithm.   
Of all the things a person can be happy about, those relating to his own life and circumstances 
seem to be especially relevant to the question of whether he is all-in-all happy. If Jane is 
happy about her family, job, neighbourhood and so forth, she is happy. If she is unhappy in 
these respects, joy over recent political developments in Burma will not make up the 
difference. Happiness is closely related, if not identical, to ‘satisfaction with one’s life as a 
whole’.5 Of course, there are people so absorbed in impersonal projects that they never reflect 
on their lives as a whole, and so cannot be said to be either satisfied or unsatisfied with them. 
Lenin was arguably such a person. Paul Erdős, the famously absent-minded Hungarian 
mathematician, may have been another. Such people can be happy about many things, but 
I’m not sure that they can be simply happy. Others may not share my intuition about this. 
Feldman [2010: 84] finds it obvious that a person ‘can have a happy life even though she 
never makes any judgement about her life as a whole’. I don’t find it so obvious. But my 
main contentions do not hinge on this.   
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 This phrase, from Tatarkiewicz [1966: 1], expresses what has come to be known as the ‘whole life 
satisfaction’ view of happiness.  
7 
 
The happiness of babies and animals. It is sometimes said that babies and animals, lacking as 
they do language, are incapable of attitudinal happiness. Ordinary linguistic practice suggests 
otherwise. We have no hesitation in describing a baby as happy to see his mother, or a dog as 
happy to be going for a walk. The difficulty is justifying such statements. How do we know 
that the baby is happy to see his mother and not just any person? How do we know that the 
dog is happy to be going for a walk as opposed to a walk in the woods? In the absence of 
direct avowals, answers to these questions must take the form of counterfactual hypotheses as 
to what the baby or dog would feel were his mother to be replaced by someone else or the 
walk to take a different course. Counterfactual hypotheses are risky, of course. But they are 
not always groundless. Experiments can be undertaken. Conditions can be varied. The 
ascription of attitudinal states to adults is often based on similar processes of elimination.  
Of course, there are some kinds of attitudinal happiness that babies and animals cannot feel, 
because they cannot think the corresponding thoughts. A dog cannot be happy that she hasn’t 
been spayed. A baby cannot be happy that he is going on holiday. And neither baby nor dog 
can be happy about its life as a whole. Some have suggested, for reasons similar to these, that 
the profoundly mentally handicapped cannot be happy in the full sense of the term. They can 
be happy about many everyday things, but not about the more general or permanent aspects 
of their lives. Their happiness lacks, so to speak, a dimension of depth. 
In conclusion, it is plausible that happiness is essentially attitudinal, even if the word itself 
does not always take an object. In what follows, I shall limit myself to overtly attitudinal 
happiness, assuming that other forms can be treated as modifications or derivations of this.  
3. Happiness and Pleasure Contrasted 
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My next task is to show that happiness and pleasure are distinct concepts. To do this, I shall 
compare a number of paired sentences referring to the same event, one treating it as an object 
of happiness, the other as an object of pleasure. As will become clear, the paired sentences 
are systematically and interestingly distinct in meaning. I do not claim that all such sentences 
are distinct in this way. Happiness and pleasure are everyday, not technical concepts, so some 
vagueness and overlap is only to be expected. Nonetheless, I believe that the distinction I am 
drawing is real and central. I make no apologies, by the way, for this appeal to ‘ordinary 
language’. ‘Happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ are both terms of ordinary language, so any 
philosophical theory of happiness and pleasure needs to be faithful to the way in which these 
terms are typically used.     
What English phrase best expresses attitudinal happiness? ‘Happy that …’ is misleading here, 
for it is often just an expression of satisfied preference, equivalent to ‘glad that …’. No 
happiness need be conveyed by ‘I’m happy that you had a good harvest in Ethiopia last 
year’.6 ‘Happy about S’ is better; it expresses, as I understand it, some feeling of happiness, 
however mild or insincere. ‘S makes me happy’ would also do, only it carries the distracting 
suggestion that S is the cause, not the object of my happiness. On balance, I have decided to 
go with ‘happy about S’ as the best expression of attitudinal happiness available in English.  
What about attitudinal pleasure? ‘Pleased that …’ is wrong for the same reason as ‘happy that 
…’. ‘I’m pleased that p’ need not express any pleasure at all, only a preference for p over not-
p together with a belief that p. (‘I’m pleased that we’re going out to dinner. It’ll be boring but 
we owe it to your parents.’ ‘I’m pleased that I received only three strokes of the cane.’) The 
same holds true of ‘pleased by…’, ‘pleased about…’ and ‘pleased to…’. ‘Take pleasure in 
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 See Davis [1981:306]: ‘A person can be happy that p even though it does not make him happy that p.’   
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…’ and ‘enjoy…’ (phrases I take to be synonymous) are nearer the mark.7 Feldman himself 
in certain places treats ‘take pleasure in…’ as expressive of attitudinal pleasure. In others, his 
focus is on the phrases ‘pleased that…’ and ‘pleased about …’.8 (This focus has fatal 
consequences for his theory, to be discussed later.) In what follows, I use the phrase ‘take 
pleasure in…’ to express attitudinal pleasure, occasionally replacing it, for stylistic 
convenience, with ‘enjoy …’.  
Here, then, are the sentences.
9
 
A) John was happy about Federer’s superb performance  
John took pleasure in Federer’s superb performance 
John can only take pleasure in Federer’s superb performance by watching it, directly or on 
TV, whereas he can be happy about it after reading a report in the paper. John might take 
                                                          
7
 Feldman [2010: 114] distinguishes attitudinal pleasure and enjoyment, claiming that the objects of 
enjoyment, in contrast to those of attitudinal pleasure, ‘are restricted to the present.’ I see no warrant for this 
distinction. Feldman himself treats ‘take pleasure in …’ as expressive of attitudinal pleasure, yet this phrase is, 
as far as I can see, equivalent to ‘enjoy …’. Certainly the objects of both are restricted to the present. I return 
to the issue at the end of the essay. 
8
 See Feldman [2010: 109}: ‘We attribute this sort of pleasure [attitudinal pleasure] to a person when we say 
that he is pleased about something, or when we say that he ‘takes pleasure in’ some state of affairs.’   
9
 Similar parings can be constructed for other languages. Thus, for instance, pair B could be translated into 
German as ‘Die Hinrichtung von Dick Turpin hat Mary glücklich gemacht’ and ‘Die Hinrichtung von Dick Turpin 
hat Mary Spass gemacht’ or into Italian as ‘Mary era felice per l'esecuzione di Dick Turpin’ and ‘Mary piacque 
l'esecuzione di Dick Turpin’ I am informed by native speakers of German and Italian that these sentences have 
all the implications I have discerned in their English counterparts. The distinction I am driving at doesn’t seem 
to be a peculiarity of English.   
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pleasure in Federer’s performance without caring or even knowing that it is Federer playing; 
his interest in tennis might be a purely aesthetic one. By contrast, if he is happy about 
Federer’s superb performance he is presumably happy that it is Federer who is performing 
superbly. The two sentences have different truth-conditions. John might be happy about 
Federer’s superb performance though he didn’t take pleasure in it: he wasn’t watching. Or he 
might have taken pleasure in it though he isn’t happy about it: he’s a Murray fan. 
B) Mary was happy about the execution of Dick Turpin 
Mary took pleasure in the execution of Dick Turpin 
Mary cannot take pleasure in the execution of Dick Turpin unless she sees or otherwise 
experiences it, whereas she might be happy about it after reading a report or hearing a 
rumour. ‘Mary is happy about the execution of Dick Turpin’ implies that she thinks it in 
some way a good thing. If asked why she is happy about it she might reply ‘it is what he 
deserves’ or ‘it will make the roads safe again’. ‘Mary took pleasure in the execution of Dick 
Turpin’ implies none of this. Mary might simply have relished the spectacle of a good 
hanging.  
C) Susan is happy about drinking the Château Lafite 
Susan takes pleasure in drinking the Château Lafite 
Susan can only take pleasure in drinking the Château Lafite if she tastes it, whereas she can 
be happy about drinking it even if she doesn’t taste it (she might be a wine snob with a heavy 
cold). ‘Susan is happy about drinking the Château Lafite’ implies that she thinks drinking the 
Château Lafite is a good thing to do, all things considered. ‘Susan takes pleasure in drinking 
the Château Lafite’ has no such implication; she might think it a terrible waste of money, yet 
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still take pleasure in it. Susan might even be said to take pleasure in drinking the Château 
Lafite not knowing that it is Château Lafite.  
These examples suggest two rough, preliminary thoughts. First, pleasure, but not happiness, 
is essentially a way of experiencing an object. (Happiness is an experience, of course, but not 
a way of experiencing an object.)  I cannot (logically) take pleasure in Federer’s performance 
unless I witness it, but I can be happy about Federer’s performance without witnessing it. 
Second, happiness, but not pleasure, is essentially bound up with beliefs about its object, in 
particular the belief that it is in some way good. Pleasure, in short, is an essentially 
experiential state. Happiness is an essentially doxastic state.  
These are rough thoughts. Let me unpack them in more detail. I wish to defend the following 
six theses: 
i. If one takes pleasure in s, one experiences s.  
To take pleasure in a state of affairs s is to experience it in a certain way. This experience 
need not be direct. One can take pleasure in s by watching it on TV or even reading about it 
in the paper (‘I’ve been enjoying the latest parliamentary drama in the pages of the Times’). 
Nor need it be tied to a particular sense modality. One can enjoy a cricket match, after a 
fashion, by listening to a radio commentary or by following a scoreboard outside the ground, 
as used to be common. (I suspect this is only possible because the pleasures of cricket are 
partly statistical. I’m not sure a tennis match could be enjoyed in this way.) Other pleasures 
are not sensory at all. Maths is a prime example. But it is still the experience of doing the 
maths that constitutes the pleasure. One cannot take pleasure in things one cannot experience, 
such as future events or merely possible events, though one can take pleasure in the thought 
of them.     
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I have said that reading reports of an event can constitute an experience of that event. This 
raises the question: at what point do reports provide one with an experience of the events 
reported as opposed to merely furnishing one with beliefs about them? The answer has to do 
with their distribution in time. Reading a succession of reports on a parliamentary drama as it 
unfolds can evoke the same feelings of tension and relief that one would feel were one there 
in person, and so be said to constitute an ‘experience’ of that drama. The same could not be 
said for a single summary report, though it might contain exactly the same information. This 
latter might suffice to make one happy about the affair, but only the  former could provide 
enjoyment of it.  
An apparent counter-example to the claim that if one takes pleasure s, one experiences s is 
the locution ‘take pleasure in/enjoy the fact that…’. I can enjoy the fact that David Cameron 
was humiliated in the Commons yesterday without experiencing David Cameron’s 
humiliation. I’m not sure that ‘enjoy the fact that…’ is good English, but in any case, it 
doesn’t controvert the thesis that pleasure is essentially a mode of experience.10 For if it 
means anything at all, taking pleasure in or enjoying the fact that p means enjoying dwelling 
on the fact that p, meditating on it, turning it over in thought. When I enjoy the fact that 
David Cameron was humiliated in the Commons I picture him flapping over his notes, his 
voice faltering, his face growing redder.
 
(A 2013 Google search by me for ‘enjoy the fact 
that’ brought up, in first place, ‘I enjoy the fact that my wife sleeps with other men’.) To 
                                                          
10
 Terence Penelhum [1964: 82] claimed that ‘I can enjoy the President’s speech, or listening to his speech, but 
neither he nor I enjoy the fact that he made the speech.’  See also Wayne Davis [1982: 244]: ‘Alan cannot 
enjoy the fact that he seduces young girls, (even though he does enjoy the act of seducing them).’ Perhaps 
linguistic conventions have changed. A 2016 Google search by me for ‘enjoy the fact that‘ brought up 
3,870,000  hits.  
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enjoy the fact that p is, in short, to enjoy thinking that p, and this kind of enjoyment is as 
much an experience as any other. 
As confirmation of this, consider the difference between the following two sentences: 
D) I take pleasure in the fact that David Cameron was humiliated  
I am happy about the fact that David Cameron was humiliated  
It is easy to imagine situations in which only one of these two sentences is true. A person 
might relish the thought of David Cameron’s being humiliated while dreading its political 
consequences, or he might welcome its political consequences while feeling bad for the man 
himself. The general point is that happiness about p (or the fact that p) does not imply any 
pleasure in the thought of p, and vice versa, though of course the two things normally come 
together.  
ii. It need not be the case that, if one is happy about s, one experiences s. 
This is clear enough from the above examples. Being happy about a state of affairs s implies 
that one holds certain beliefs about the nature of s, but these beliefs need not be based on any 
experience of s, direct or indirect. They can be based purely on reports. 
iii. If one is happy about s, one believes that s satisfies the description ‘s’. 
Suppose that Mary is happy about Dick Turpin’s execution. Then someone informs her that 
there has been a muddle-up at the gallows; Dick Turpin has escaped and another poor wretch 
hung in his place. Mary’s happiness evaporates. The event she thought of as the execution of 
Dick Turpin was not, in fact, the execution of Dick Turpin. ‘I was happy about the execution 
of Dick Turpin’, she might say, ‘but now I realise that I had nothing to be happy about.’ 
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In short, when we say that Mary is happy about the execution of Dick Turpin, we are using 
the phrase ‘the execution of Dick Turpin’ in an intensional sense. We need not be able to 
replace it with an extensionally equivalent phrase – ‘the execution of Mary’s brother’, say 
(assuming that Dick Turpin is in fact Mary’s long-lost brother) – without changing its truth-
value; Mary would not be happy about that at all. And we can say legitimately say that Mary 
is happy about the execution of Dick Turpin even if, unbeknownst to her, Dick Turpin has not 
been executed. (It sounds a bit odd, perhaps, but no odder than ‘Timmy is looking forwards 
to the visit of Father Christmas’.) Happiness about s is always happiness about s as s or 
‘under the description’ s. Happiness is a propositional attitude.11  
iv. It need not be the case that, if one takes pleasure in s, one believes that s satisfies 
the description ‘s’. 
Mary is at Tyburn enjoying the execution, as she thinks, of Dick Turpin. Someone tells her 
that there’s been a muddle-up in prison; Dick Turpin has escaped and someone else brought 
for execution in his place. Mary’s enjoyment of the event is unaffected. She has nothing 
against Dick Turpin. In fact, she knows nothing about him apart from his name. She just likes 
the spectacle of a good hanging. Indeed (to put the point the other way round) we can 
legitimately say that Mary is enjoying the execution of Dick Turpin even if Mary herself has 
no idea that the man whose execution she is enjoying is in fact Dick Turpin. 
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 The fact that ‘the execution of Dick Turpin’ in the sentence ‘Mary is happy about the execution of Dick 
Turpin’ is not a proposition needn’t trouble us, for it can easily be converted into one without change of 
meaning: ‘Mary is happy about the fact that Dick Turpin has been executed’. The same is true for all the other 
examples above.  
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In short, when we say that so-and-so takes pleasure in or enjoys s, the phrase s is often being 
used in a purely extensional sense. We can replace it with any referentially equivalent phrase 
without changing the sentence’s truth value. (Admittedly it sounds odd to say that Mary 
enjoyed the execution of her brother, or that Oedipus enjoyed sleeping with his mother, but 
both things might still be true, in one important sense.) Conversely, we cannot say that Mary 
enjoyed the execution of Dick Turpin unless Dick Turpin was in fact executed. (We can say 
that she enjoyed the fact that, as she thought, Dick Turpin was executed, but that, as we have 
seen, is another thing entirely.) Enjoyment of s is not always enjoyment of s as s or under the 
description s. It is not always a propositional attitude. 
Why do I say ‘not always’ rather than simply ‘not’? The answer is that there is another type 
of enjoyment (‘enjoyment of fact’ as distinct from ‘enjoyment of substance’, to use Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s terms) which is conditional on its object being thought to satisfy a given 
description.
12
 Let us suppose that Mary is accompanied by her friend Chloe, whose brother 
has been killed by Dick Turpin. Chloe takes a vindictive delight in Dick Turpin’s death. She 
is enjoying, we might say, the execution of her brother’s murderer. Should she discover that 
the man on the gallows is not her brother’s murderer, her enjoyment must cease. Another 
example from Anscombe is ‘Jane is enjoying talking to the most handsome man present’. On 
a natural interpretation of this phrase, Jane’s enjoyment of the man’s company must wither 
the moment her eyes alight on a more handsome man. Both these sentences pick out the 
object of enjoyment intensionally, not extensionally; they do not imply that Chloe is enjoying 
the execution of Mary’s long-lost brother, or that Jane is enjoying talking to the  biggest 
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 See Anscombe [1967]. Wayne Davis [1981: 310] makes a similar distinction between what he calls ‘epistemic 
happifying’ and ‘non-epistemic happifying’. However, he treats this as a distinction within, not between, 
pleasure and happiness, mental states he regards as identical. 
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crook in the room. However, the feeling they describe is still one of pleasure, not happiness, 
since its object is essentially experiential. Chloe can only take pleasure in the execution of her 
brother’s murderer if she experiences it, whereas she can be happy about it without 
experiencing it.  
v. If one is happy about s, one believes (on pain of irrationality) that s is in some 
way good. 
Thesis 5 is based on the thought that the object of happiness is always some perceived good, 
personal or general. In scholastic terms, goodness is the ‘formal object’ of happiness, just as 
danger is of fear, a gift of gratitude, and so forth.
 13
 Such formal objects stand in a 
relationship of justification to their corresponding emotions. To realise that the object of 
one’s happiness is not in fact good is to see that it gives one no reason to be happy. For 
instance, if Mary finds out that Dick Turpin was not a brutal murderer but a gallant Robin 
Hood type figure, her happiness over his execution should melt away. His execution is no 
cause for happiness.  
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 This thesis must be distinguished from the ‘guise of the good’ hypothesis, according to which the rational 
agent always pursues ends he regards as good. It might seem vulnerable to a parallel counter-proposal, 
though, which is that happiness about a state of affairs s implies only a desire for s and a belief that s obtains; 
it does not commit one to a further belief that s is good. I’m not sure that this counter-proposal succeeds, but 
in any case it does not undermine the contrast I am drawing between happiness and pleasure. For even if we 
want to rephrase Thesis 5 as ‘if one is happy about s, one desires s and believes that s obtains’, it is clear that 
enjoying s implies no such desire. Mary, in the example below, does not desire the execution of Dick Turpin, 
but she is not behaving irrationally in nonetheless taking pleasure in it. For further discussion, see Velleman 
[1992]. 
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I add the proviso ‘on pain of irrationality’ in acknowledgement of the fact that it is possible to 
be happy about a state of affairs one does not think good. Consider a woman who embarks on 
an affair knowing that it will probably end in misery and destroy her marriage into the 
bargain. She has no good reason to be happy about the affair, yet she is happy about it – 
‘absurdly happy’, as we might say. Emotions can be what Goldie [2000: 78] calls 
‘cognitively impenetrable’: one can feel towards things as being a particular way ‘whilst at 
the same time believing them not to be so’. Emotions and beliefs can come apart, even if they 
ought in all consistency to move together.  
The phenomenon of happy moods suggests a qualification of this connection, for the thoughts 
associated with such moods are typically ‘entertained’ rather than strictly believed. Take this 
description of a happy mood, from Virginia Woolf’s Room of One’s Own: 
And thus by degrees was lit, half-way down the spine, which is the seat of the 
soul, not that hard little electric light which we call brilliance, as it pops in and out 
upon our lips, but the more profound, subtle and subterranean glow which is the 
rich yellow flame of rational intercourse. No need to hurry. No need to sparkle. 
No need to be anyone but oneself. We are all going to heaven and Vandyke is of 
the company – in other words, how good life seemed, how sweet its rewards, how 
trivial this grudge or that grievance, how admirable friendship and the society of 
one’s kind, as, lighting a good cigarette, one sunk among the cushions in the 
window-seat [1977: 12]. 
Clearly, Virginia Woolf does not believe that life is good and so forth, nor is she rationally 
committed to any such belief; rather, she entertains these thoughts because she is in a happy 
mood. To describe this state of mind as irrational would be absurdly solemn. (Should we 
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reprove Virginia Woolf for entertaining without seriously believing the thought that the 
rewards of life are sweet? What could it mean to believe such a thing anyway?) Still, moods 
are not entirely exempt from the demands of rational justification. On occasions when the 
rewards of life are visibly not sweet, it is best not to feel towards them as if they were, even 
playfully. Someone whose happy mood cannot be dented even by the death of a close friend 
or a declaration of war is either emotionally stunted or in denial. And a metaphysical 
pessimist must regard the thought that life is good, even if entertained only occasionally and 
light-heartedly, as an unfitting response to cosmic desolation. Conversely, if life is the gift of 
a benevolent God, black moods must be regarded as a form of ingratitude.   
vi. It need not be the case that, if one takes pleasure in s, one believes (on pain of 
irrationality) that s is in some way good. 
Suppose that Mary is enjoying the execution of Dick Turpin when a bystander tells her that 
he is not in fact a brutal assassin but a noble defender of the poor. Mary believes this, yet her 
pleasure in his execution is undiminished. She simply enjoys the sight of someone being 
killed.  
Mary’s pleasure in an event she thinks bad may be reprehensible, but it is not obviously 
irrational. Many people enjoy without qualm or inner conflict things they do not think good 
or think positively bad. Refusal to enjoy such things is a mark of character, not a requirement 
of reason. It is frivolous, but not incoherent, to say ‘I enjoyed the destruction of the World 
Trade Centre, though I thought it a wicked and pointless act.’ By contrast, the statement ‘I 
was happy about the destruction of the World Trade Centre, though I thought it a wicked and 
pointless act’ is puzzling; if one was happy about it, one surely thought it good in some way. 
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Of course, if practical rationality includes virtue, as has been argued by Warren Quinn [1993: 
210-217] and Philippa Foot [2001: 52-65], and if virtue involves taking pleasure in what one 
ought, as Aristotle taught, then taking pleasure in things one believes to be bad is ipso facto 
irrational. I shall not try to assess this set of ideas here. I shall only say that if there is any 
irrationality involved in taking pleasure in things one believes to be bad, it is distinct from the 
stronger kind of irrationality involved in being happy about things one believes to be bad. 
The happy adulterer described earlier was a divided soul, rather as someone frightened of 
mice or heights is a divided soul. In Goldie’s [2000: 78] words, she was ‘feeling towards 
things as being a particular way, whilst at the same time believing them not to be so’. 
Nothing like this is involved in the case of Mary. A pleasure-seeker may be cynical and 
frivolous yet utterly self-possessed.    
Let me summarise. Happiness and attitudinal pleasure are distinct states of mind. To take 
pleasure in s is necessarily to experience s; to be happy about s is not necessarily to 
experience s. To be happy about s is necessarily to believe that s satisfies the description ‘s’. 
To take pleasure in s is not necessarily to have such a belief. To be happy about s is to be 
rationally committed to a belief that s is in some way good. To take pleasure in s is not to be 
committed to any such belief.  
4. Hedonism about happiness 
Let me return to the question with which I opened this essay: the question of hedonism about 
happiness. Fred Feldman [2010: 137] has argued that ‘to be happy at a moment is to be taking 
more pleasure than displeasure in things at that moment. Happiness in an interval is the 
integral of happiness at moments within the interval. … Happiness in life as a whole is 
happiness in the interval that is your whole life.’ I needn’t dwell here on the details of this 
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theory, for if I am right, any attempt to define happiness in terms of pleasure is doomed from 
the outset. It involves assimilating one type of mental state to another quite different type – a 
kind of category mistake. 
The problem with Feldman’s hedonistic theory of happiness can be stated simply: it is 
possible to take more pleasure than displeasure in things while all the time being unhappy. 
Not only is this possible, I suspect it is quite common. Imagine a man in his mid-thirties, 
single, childless, directionless. When he thinks about his life, he feels depressed. But he 
doesn’t think about his life too often. He immerses himself in various leisure pursuits: fine 
wine, extreme sports, casual affairs. On the whole, he enjoys himself. But he is not happy. 
Conversely, imagine a couple struggling with triplets. Their life contains few pleasures, yet 
they love their children and have hope for the future. They are not enjoying themselves. But 
they are happy.
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What has gone wrong? Feldman’s error is twofold. First, he concentrates solely on what I 
have called ‘all-in-all’ happiness, ignoring attitudinal happiness. This is a mistake, since, as I 
have said, all-in-all happiness is logically dependent on happiness about various facts, in 
particular facts concerning one’s own life. Had Feldman taken note of attitudinal happiness, 
he might have realised that it is a state fundamentally different from attitudinal pleasure.   
Feldman’s second mistake concerns pleasure. He explicates attitudinal pleasure with the aid 
of phrases such as ‘pleased that…’ and ‘pleased to…’, concluding that it must entail belief. 
‘If Tom is pleased to be living in Massachusetts, then he must think that he is living in 
Massachusetts [2010: 115].’ This is true, but as I have said, ‘pleased to…’ and ‘pleased 
that…’ are not necessarily expressions of pleasure at all. To be pleased that p is simply to 
                                                          
14
 I am indebted to a reviewer of the paper for this example. 
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have a preference for p over not-p together with a belief that p. Attitudinal pleasure is more 
exactly expressed by the phrases ‘take pleasure in…’ and ‘enjoy…’, neither of which entails 
belief. Susan can take pleasure in drinking Château Lafite without believing that it is Château 
Lafite.  
Feldman’s insistence that pleasure is a propositional attitude also causes him to overlook its 
experiential character. If (to borrow his examples) John is pleased that he will spend his 
golden years in Massachusetts or that 1937 ends long before 2037, neither of which things he 
can experience, it seems to follow that pleasure is not a mode of experience [2010: 114]. But 
we can run the inference the other way: the fact that we can be ‘pleased that’ p, where p is not 
something we can experience, only goes to show that ‘pleased that’ and other such phrases do 
not express pleasure. The crucial point is that we can only ‘take pleasure in’ or ‘enjoy’ what 
we experience. Feldman, as some of his critics point out, has over-intellectualised pleasure.
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However, Feldman is not entirely consistent in his rejection of the experiential character of 
pleasure. In certain places, he suggests that attitudinal pleasure is expressed not only by 
‘pleased that …’ and ‘pleased to …’ but also ‘takes pleasure in …’ and even ‘enjoys …’. For 
instance, Feldman tries to persuade us that ‘Otto’, the ‘rigid Kantian moralist’ who dutifully 
visits his sick neighbour in hospital, is not feeling attitudinal pleasure since he does not 
‘enjoy’ or ‘take pleasure in’ the visit.16 He neglects to mention that Otto might well be 
pleased that he is visiting his sick neighbour, meaning simply that he is glad to be fulfilling 
his duty. 
                                                          
15
 See Mason [2007] and Zimmerman [2007]. 
16
 Feldman [2010: 117]. Feldman’s use of the verb ‘enjoy’ in this context is puzzling, since he claims elsewhere 
that enjoyment is not the same as attitudinal pleasure. See footnote 7. 
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Overlooked in this discussion is the fact that ‘pleased that …’ and ‘takes pleasure in …’ mean 
quite different things. ‘Pleased that …’ implies belief but not necessarily experience; ‘takes 
pleasure in …’ implies experience but not necessarily belief. Feldman needs both phrases. He 
needs the first to show that attitudinal pleasure is unlimited in its objects, else it would not be 
a plausible constituent of happiness; and he needs the second to show that it is essentially 
experiential, else it would not be recognisable as pleasure. But of course, no one mental state 
can be both unlimited in its objects and limited to objects of experience. Feldman’s 
‘attitudinal pleasure’ is a mishmash. Real attitudinal pleasure is always pleasure in some 
object of experience, and as such is categorially distinct from happiness.
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